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CLASS DIFFERENCES IN ESTABLISHMENT PATHWAYS TO FATHERHOOD WAGE PREMIUMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Organizations have been argued to favor fathers over childless men and skilled fathers over less-
skilled ones, but group wage inequalities vary across as well as within establishments. This paper 
theorizes class differences in the contribution of being employed in a high-wage firm to the 
fatherhood wage premium. Analyses of linked employer-employee data from the Canadian 
Workplace and Employee Survey reveal that sorting into high-wage establishments accounts for 
60% of the economy-wide premium for less-educated and non-professional fathers, whereas 
high-skilled fathers tend to work in lower-wage establishments but receive the largest net 
fatherhood premium within firms. Among the subsample of fathers who changed employers in 
the past five years, less-skilled fathers fared worse whereas high-skilled fathers sorted into high-
wage firms. Results thus suggest that employment in a higher wage firm likely enables less-
skilled men to transition to fatherhood, whereas high-wage employers may discriminate in favor 
of only high-skilled fathers in hiring.  
 
Keywords: Canadian families, fatherhood, income or wages, paternal employment 
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CLASS DIFFERENCES IN ESTABLISHMENT PATHWAYS TO FATHERHOOD WAGE PREMIUMS 
 
Parenthood widens gender economic inequalities, with fatherhood predicting a wage premium 
that contrasts with the wage penalty for motherhood (Lundberg & Rose, 2000). Not all fathers 
benefit equally, though, as the magnitude of the North American net fatherhood wage premium 
can vary across groups (Glauber, 2008; Hodges & Budig, 2010; Killewald, 2013; Waite & 
Denier, 2015). One structural argument for group differences in the premium is that they 
legitimate between- and within-gender hierarchies of bureaucratic organizations (Hodges and 
Budig 2010). But wages vary as much across as within establishments (Groshen, 1991; Lazear & 
Shaw, 2008). Consequently, how workers sort into low- or high-wage establishments can 
account for some of the economy-wide group wage inequalities (Fuller, forthcoming; Javdani, 
2015; Pendakur & Woodcock, 2010). In this paper we theorize and test educational and 
occupational differences in the contribution of establishment sorting to fatherhood wage 
premiums.  
Very little is known about the role of establishment sorting and fatherhood wage premiums 
because of the limited availability of representative matched employee-employer data 
(Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt, 2016). Through the 1990s, Europe was ahead of North 
America in the needed data (Abowd & Kramarz, 1999).
 
Analysis of one such Norwegian 
administrative data set found that white-collar fathers were actually located in lower-paying 
establishments than their childless counterparts; it was their over-representation in higher-paying 
occupations within establishments that accounted for their slight wage premium (Petersen, 
Penner, & Høgnes, 2014). Yet group differences in U.S. fatherhood premiums raise the question 
of whether the sorting processes are the same for all educational or occupational groups.  
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Furthermore, Norway and the other Nordic countries enjoy extensive centralized wage-
setting that reduces aggregate wage inequality (Card, Lemieux, & Riddell, 2003) and wage 
variation across establishments (Simón, 2010). Nordic social policies also narrow gender 
employment disparities associated with parenthood (Petersen, et al., 2014). These national 
policies and institutions likely account for the much smaller net fatherhood premium found for 
Norwegian (Petersen, et al., 2014) and Swedish (Albrecht, Björklund, & Vroman, 2003) men as 
compared with the 5% to 9% net premium found for U.S. (Hodges & Budig, 2010; Killewald, 
2013; Lundberg & Rose, 2000) and Canadian fathers (Waite & Denier, 2015). In the more 
unequal North American context, sorting into high-wage workplaces may be an important 
pathway to a fatherhood wage premium, particularly for less-skilled men with less portable 
human capital.  
We use Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) to investigate the role 
of establishment sorting in configuring fatherhood wage premiums and group differences therein. 
A notable strength of the WES is that it contains a largely representative sample of employed 
men. Results are therefore not restricted to a particular organization, industry, or employer size 
as is often the case in organizational research (Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt, 2016). The 
WES allows us to estimate what proportion of the economy-wide fatherhood premium and group 
differences in it net of men’s individual characteristics derives from differential sorting into 
higher- or lower-wage establishments. Additional analyses assess whether sorting into higher-
wage workplaces accounts for even more of the fatherhood premium among the subsample of 
men who voluntarily changed establishments for “a better job” in the past five years. These 
analyses provide new insights into class differences in the establishment pathways to the 
fatherhood wage premium.  
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EXPLAINING FATHERS’ WAGE PREMIUM 
One cornerstone of gender economic inequality is the disparate impact parenthood has on 
women’s and men’s wages. Some of this reflects gender differences in education and full-time 
experience (Blau & Kahn, 2016), occupations (Blau & Kahn, 2016), and short- or long-work 
hours (Weeden, Cha, & Bucca, 2016). But net of these characteristics, Canadian (Zhang, 2009) 
and U.S. (Budig & England, 2001) mothers incur 4 to 5% penalties for second and higher-order 
births, whereas fathers receive a net wage premium of similar magnitude for each additional 
child (Killewald, 2013; Lundberg & Rose, 2002; Waite & Denier, 2015). Although sensitive to 
modeling decisions, group differences in the net fatherhood premium have also been reported. 
Highly-educated and professional (Hodges & Budig, 2010), married (Hodges & Budig, 2010; 
Killewald, 2013), and heterosexual (Waite & Denier, 2015) fathers may garner larger net 
premiums than their less-advantaged, single or cohabiting, and gay counterparts.  
 Some of the association between fatherhood and higher gross wages can be accounted for 
by unobserved heterogeneity as well as individual characteristics. As to unobserved 
heterogeneity, positive selection might account for the gross premium if the men who become 
fathers have unmeasured characteristics such as loyalty and commitment valued similarly by 
employers and potential partners. Positive selection does account for some of the premium in a 
few European countries, but there is no evidence of any selection in others (Koslowski, 2011). In 
the United States, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the fatherhood premium are smaller 
than fixed effects estimates, suggesting U.S. men are negatively selected into fatherhood on 
stable unmeasured characteristics (Hodges & Budig, 2010; Lundberg & Rose, 2002).  
 We cannot control for individual fixed effects with the WES data. So depending on 
whether selection effects among Canadian men are similar to Europe or the United States, our 
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OLS estimates might under- or over-state the fatherhood wage premium net of stable unobserved 
characteristics. However, to our knowledge there is no evidence that the direction of selection 
differs across groups of men within a country. Conclusions of varying group patterns of effects 
should therefore be robust even if the estimates are downwardly or upwardly biased.  
   A second explanation for the gross premium is that fatherhood is a transformational 
experience. Under the male breadwinner norm (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004), becoming a father 
may motivate men to work longer, harder, or switch occupations or jobs to increase their 
earnings (Lundberg & Rose, 2000; Percheski & Wildeman, 2008). Wives’ responsibility for the 
bulk of family unpaid work in theory supports this greater effort (Becker, 1981). If so, then these 
factors should fully account for any gross wage premium associated with fatherhood. But a wage 
premium persists regardless of whether fathers’ paid work hours increase or decrease (Glauber, 
2008; Koslowski, 2011; Lundberg & Rose, 2000) and irrespective of their time in unpaid 
domestic work (Killewald & Garcia-Manglano, 2016; Koslowski, 2011). There is conflicting 
evidence as to whether wives’ employment reduces the premium (Hodges & Budig, 2010; 
Killewald, 2013; Lundberg & Rose, 2000), but relative household specialization does not 
account for group differences in it (Glauber, 2008; Hodges & Budig, 2010).  
 Killewald (2013) contends those fathers most committed to the breadwinner role exert the 
greatest effort, and are therefore the only ones to earn a significant premium net of individual 
characteristics. Killewald (2013) had no measures of commitment or effort per se, but she argued 
it was strongest when men were married and co-residing with their biological children. In this 
family form, Killewald (2013) found no educational or racial-ethnic differences in the net 
premium. Her conclusions regarding group differences should be viewed with caution, however. 
The well-documented educational and racial gradients in marriage and divorce (Smock & 
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Greenland, 2010) suggest effects associated with marriage and co-residing with biological 
children mask education and racial-ethnic differences in the likelihood of being in this group, a 
possibility Killewald (2013, 109) acknowledges.  
Structural Explanations 
Any fatherhood wage premium that remains after accounting for individual and household 
factors is often attributed to employer discrimination. Widespread cultural beliefs of fathers as 
family breadwinners may color employer perceptions of their productivity and commitment 
(Ridgeway & Correll, 2004; Killewald, 2013). Hodges and Budig (2010) argued that inequalities 
become entrenched when stereotypes about the productivity of different groups are linked with 
organizational distinctions (see also Ridgeway, 2011; Tilly, 1998). From this Hodges and Budig 
hypothesized that the net wage privilege of fatherhood would be greatest for men displaying 
hegemonic masculinities prized within bureaucratic organizations, such as rational authoritative 
leadership and technical competence (Acker, 1990; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). In support 
of this, Hodges and Budig (2010) found that a university degree and being in a professional 
occupation predicted significantly larger net premiums for white married U.S. fathers.  
 A weakness in Hodges and Budig’s (2010) conceptualization is that they ignored that 
wages vary as much across organizations as within them (Britton, 2000; Groshen, 1991; Lazear 
& Shaw, 2008). Employer discrimination coupled with bureaucratic logics may indeed favor 
fathers within a given workplace, but both the premium and group differences in it potentially 
derive from how groups of fathers are distributed across establishments as well. The contribution 
of establishment sorting to the economy-wide fatherhood premium cannot be tested with the 
individual-level data used in North American studies to date.  
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ESTABLISHMENT SORTING AND THE FATHERHOOD WAGE PREMIUM 
Establishments account for as much if not more wage variation as occupations (Groshen, 1991; 
Lazear & Shaw, 2008), but their contribution to family wage inequalities is a relatively new area 
of study. Establishments vary in their average wages, with some employers paying higher 
average wages to encourage greater productivity, accumulation of firm-specific skills, and 
reduce employee turnover (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Weiss, 1990). The differential sorting of 
groups into high-wage establishments contributes to economy-wide group wage inequalities. For 
example, differential access to higher-paying establishments account for a large part of the glass 
ceilings faced by equally-qualified Canadian women (Javdani, 2015) and immigrants (Pendakur 
& Woodcock, 2010), and Fuller (forthcoming) finds that sorting into lower-wage establishments 
accounts for the bulk of Canadian women’s motherhood wage penalty. 
 Over-representation in high-wage firms—positive sorting—could contribute to fathers’ 
wage premium. Petersen and his colleagues (2014) did not find this to be the case among white-
collar Norwegian fathers, but the restricted occupational focus of that study precludes 
generalizing to all workers. The possible reasons for fathers’ over-representation in high-wage 
firms span selection, motivation, and employer discrimination in conjunction with two general 
worker strategies for enhancing wages.  
 The first worker strategy is to stay with a firm and ascend the career ladder, accruing any 
wage benefits of tenure and firm-specific skills. On average the annual wage returns to tenure are 
quite small, between 1 and 3% (Altonji & Williams, 2005; Farber, 1999). Tenure returns are 
greater, however, in the high-wage firms paying a premium to retain workers (Farber, 1999). In 
turn, fathers might be prevalent in high-wage establishments because of selection. Men 
employed in high-wage establishments may be more likely to transition to fatherhood insofar as 
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higher wages and the prospect of greater wage growth make it easier to meet the extra expenses 
of children. A related possibility is that theories of the causal relationship between fatherhood 
and productivity may have the order wrong. Rather than fatherhood making men more 
productive, more productive men may be more likely to become fathers. As high-wage firms 
seek and reward more productive workers, fathers (if truly productive) would be more likely to 
be among their workforces.  
 H1: Our first hypothesis is therefore that sorting into high-wage firms accounts for a 
significant proportion of the fatherhood wage premium among white Canadian men. We do not 
have the individual-level panel data to assess men’s selection directly, but if being in high-wage 
establishments accounts for the fatherhood premium, controlling for sorting should reduce or 
even eliminate the economy-wide wage premium net of fathers’ individual characteristics.  
 We further anticipate class differences in the contribution of establishment sorting to the 
fatherhood wage premium. Less-skilled workers have fewer within-firm pathways to higher 
wages than high-skilled workers. Their job ladders rarely extend high in the organizational ranks 
and their lower skills reduce the likelihood of changing positions within the firm to access 
higher-reaching ladders (Rosenfeld, 1992). Less-skilled workers also have less access to 
performance-related bonuses. Lemieux and his colleagues (2009) found that twice as many U.S. 
men in professional and managerial occupations received performance-based incentive pay—and 
its associated wage bonus—as compared with men in craft occupations. Consequently, average 
returns to tenure are flatter for less-skilled men (Gottshalk, 2001).  
 These class differences in within-firm opportunity structures mean less-skilled fathers have 
fewer possibilities for increasing their wages vis-à-vis childless men within a given 
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establishment, which increases the desirability of being in a high-wage firm. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
 H2: Sorting into high-wage establishments accounts for more of the economy-wide 
fatherhood wage premium for less-educated fathers and those in non-professional occupations 
than for their high-skilled counterparts.  
 In contrast, the superior within-firm opportunity structures for university-educated fathers 
and those in professional or managerial occupations leave greater room for inequalities to 
emerge between fathers’ and childless men’s wages. Hence: 
 H3: Net of establishment sorting, high-skilled fathers will have larger fatherhood wage 
premiums than lesser-skilled fathers. 
Changing Establishments 
Some indication of individual motivation and/or employer discrimination behind sorting into 
high-wage establishments may be ascertained among fathers undertaking the second strategy for 
enhancing wages: voluntarily changing establishments in pursuit of a better job (Burdett, 1978; 
Farber, 1999). There are other reasons workers change jobs, including being fired, laid off, or 
having a business close. These are forced job changes, however, and in the United States are on 
average associated with wage penalties (Fuller, 2008). We limit theorization and analysis to 
voluntary changes to focus on those indicating fathers’ greater agency and freedom to be more 
selective in order to enhance wages.  
 For all workers, the returns to a voluntary move should exceed any costs, including the 
time to find job vacancies, write letters of application, attend interviews, as well as lost tenure 
premiums with the current firm (Burdett, 1978; Devine & Kiefer, 1991). In general, however, we 
believe fathers will be less likely than childless men to voluntarily change employers for three 
11 
 
reasons. First, searching for a new job takes time and effort, and fathers may find their ability to 
do so constrained by family time obligations. Second, fathers are also likely to be more 
geographically limited given the need to consider disruption to children’s lives when an 
employer change necessitates a residential move. Third, fathers may be more risk-averse. New 
jobs do not always work out and given family financial obligations, fathers may be less willing 
to take this risk even if offered favorable initial wages. These constraints raise fathers’ 
reservation wage, which predicts lower voluntary mobility. Consequently: 
 H4: Fathers will be less likely to voluntarily change employers than childless men.  
 Although fathers will be less likely to change firms, fatherhood may motivate those that do 
to take on the additional search costs of finding positions in high-wage establishments to ensure 
greater returns over time. High-wage employer discrimination could favor fathers over childless 
men during the hiring process as well. At the hiring stage, employers have less information about 
an applicant’s productivity and may draw on perceptions of a group’s productivity when 
deciding whom to hire (Altonji & Blank, 1999). The cultural stereotype of fathers as motivated 
family breadwinners promotes this perception (Killewald, 2013; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). To 
date, correspondence studies of employer hiring have found no statistically significant bias 
favoring fathers over childless men with identical résumés (Bygren, Erlandsson, & Gähler, 2017; 
Correll, Benard, & Paik, 2008). Yet no correspondence study has distinguished employers’ 
average wage levels. High-wage employers could be more inclined to view fatherhood as a 
salient indicator of the productive and loyal workers they seek. Therefore, the possibility that 
high-wage employers discriminate in favor of fathers in hiring cannot be ruled out.  
 Possible mover-father motivation and/or high-wage employer hiring prejudices lead to the 
final set of hypotheses.  
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 H5: If fathers are motivated to find a new high-wage employer or if such employers are 
more likely to hire fathers than childless men, sorting into high-wage establishments should 
account for a significant portion of the fatherhood wage premium among voluntary mover 
fathers.  
 Whether or not there are class differences in these sorting effects is more ambiguous. On 
the one hand, Killewald (2013) did not find any educational differences in wage premiums once 
limiting the group to the married fathers co-residing with biological children that she considered 
highly-committed. All fathers that voluntarily change jobs for better wages could similarly be 
considered highly committed to their breadwinning role. In addition, if higher-wage employers 
unilaterally favor the real or perceived productivity of fathers over childless men, there should be 
no class differences in premiums. One possibility is therefore:  
 H6a: If there are no class differences in mover fathers’ motivation and/or higher-wage 
employers similarly value the perceived or real productivity of fathers, there should be no 
educational or occupational differences in positive sorting among mover fathers.  
 On the other hand, high-skilled fathers may be more motivated or more savvy about 
ascertaining the average wage structure of employers and future career prospects than less-
skilled fathers. There also remains the possibility that high-wage bureaucratic organizations 
indeed favor fathers along class lines as argued by Hodges and Budig (2010). The competing 
possibility is consequently: 
 H6b: If high-skilled mover fathers are more motivated, and/or better ascertain and take 
new positions in high-wage establishments, and/or if such establishments favor high-skilled 
fathers in hiring, sorting into high-wage firms would account for more of the wage premium 
among higher-skilled than lesser-skilled mover fathers.   
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METHOD 
Data and Sample 
Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) is a mandatory survey fielded from 1999 to 
2005, with response rates in excess of 80% for both establishments and employees. The WES 
employer sample is drawn from the Business Register and consists of all establishments in 
Canadian provinces with paid employees, with a small number of exceptions, primarily 
government administration (5.3% of Canadian employment), private households, and religious 
organizations. The survey unit is the workplace/establishment, so multi-site employers could 
have multiple entries in the WES. The establishment sample is longitudinal and refreshed every 
second year to maintain representativeness.  
In each odd year (1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005), a new random sample of up to 24 
employees was drawn from each establishment proportional to its total size, and then followed 
the next year regardless of whether the employee continued working for the same establishment. 
We restrict analyses to the odd-numbered years to ensure employee outcomes are tied to the 
same establishment, pooling data waves to maximize sample size.  
From the pooled data we select white Canadian male workers between the ages of 24 and 
44. We limit the sample to white men because the complexity of Canada’s minority immigrant 
population warrants a separate analysis (see Pendakur & Woodcock, 2010). The lower age is set 
to 24 because the WES does not reveal whether individuals are currently enrolled in school. Men 
older than 44 are excluded because the WES indicates only if fathers are currently living with 
children, not whether they have ever had children. At older ages, the group without resident 
children is more likely to include more men whose children have all grown and left home. These 
restrictions yield an analytical sample of 21,225 men embedded in 5,713 establishment-years, 
and 5,020 unique establishments.  
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To identify a subsample of mover fathers, the WES contains information on whether 
fathers changed jobs the year prior to or any year subsequent to the birth of their first child. The 
referent when estimating fatherhood wage premiums using this variable would be all childless 
men. Yet childless men also change jobs to enhance their wages, so a referent including childless 
men who stayed as well as moved might inflate mover-fathers’ wage premium. Unfortunately, 
there is no commensurate time point to a birth by which to select a group of childless movers.  
Instead, there is also a question in the WES asking whether a worker voluntarily changed 
employers in the past five years for “a better job.” We select a subsample of such voluntary 
movers. To test fathers’ relative voluntary mobility (Hypothesis 4), we include all fathers who 
moved in the past five years to ensure we do not underestimate fathers’ likelihood of changing 
jobs as compared with the full sample. To estimate mover-father sorting and wages (Hypotheses 
5 and 6) from the mover-only sample we subtract the small percentage of mover fathers who are 
still with their pre-birth employer (i.e., they moved in the past five years but before the birth of 
their first child). This mover subsample (n=3,165) allows us to assess establishment sorting 
removing any pre-birth selection into high-wage firms, providing insight into effects of father 
motivation or employer discrimination in positive sorting.  
Variables 
The dependent variable is men’s hourly wages, which include base earnings as well as bonuses, 
profit sharing, tips, etc. WES respondents were allowed to report different bases of pay; weekly 
or yearly reports are converted to an hourly wage rate by Statistics Canada based on reported 
hours and weeks worked. We take the natural log of hourly wages to normalize the wage 
distribution and minimize the impact of outliers.  
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The key independent variable is whether a man is a father, measured with a binary variable 
coded one when a man lives with at least one child under the age of 19. The data do not indicate 
whether co-residential children are biologically related to the father. Neither is there information 
on non-residential children. Killewald (2013) found that non-residential children had no impact 
on U.S. fathers’ wages, whereas stepchildren predicted significant wage penalties. If the 
biological relationship matters in Canada, fatherhood wage estimates may be conservative as 
they include stepchildren. 
 Class is measured with education and occupation. This includes four education indicator 
variables (less than high school, high school degree (referent), non-university postsecondary 
certificate, and university degree or higher). Another indicator is for men who work in 
professional or managerial occupations, against the referent of all other occupations. We do not 
display the model estimates, but instead use the model estimates to calculate the predicted 
fatherhood wage premium for each group, including the referents, to facilitate comparison of 
effects across groups. The predicted estimate takes into account the interaction as well as main 
effects of the variables, with the appropriate standard errors. 
 Also included in the models are partnership status indicators, one for cohabiting men and a 
second for single men, against a referent of married men. Some studies have attempted to assess 
the impact of partnered men’s breadwinning status on their premium (Hodges & Budig, 2010; 
Killewald, 2013). A problem with the breadwinner hypothesis is that fathers’ higher wages may 
encourage mothers to leave the labor force or reduce work hours, not vice versa. For example, 
Shafer (2011) found that husbands’ absolute wages were a stronger predictor of wives’ labor 
force exit than her relative wages. The WES contains no instrumental variables for dealing with 
this endogeneity. Additional models reveal that breadwinning partnered fathers earn significantly 
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larger net wage premiums than dual-earning fathers, but sorting into high-wage firms does not 
account for much of this (results available from the authors).  
Included in all models are actual years of full-time experience, along with its square. To 
capture that returns to experience vary by education, we add further interactions between the 
experience and education variables (Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2006). Indicator variables 
denote men who work part-time (less than 35 hours per week), and men who work long weekly 
hours (more than 49). Dummies for survey year control for business cycle effects. In the full 
sample wage analysis, tenure with the current employer is included as a continuous measure, 
along with its square. We include interaction terms between tenure and education to account for 
potential differences in returns to seniority (Gottshalk, 2001); these were minimal.  
Analytical Strategy 
Logit regression is used to assess fathers’ likelihood of voluntarily changing workplaces, 
including interaction terms between fatherhood and the education and occupation variables. The 
logit estimates are used to predict each group’s likelihood of voluntarily changing jobs in the 
past five years. To test hypotheses regarding the role of establishment sorting in configuring 
group differences in the net fatherhood wage premium, we compare estimates of the economy-
wide premium with the within-establishment premium for all fathers as well as for the indicated 
educational and occupational groups of fathers, and for groups of fathers in the mover 
subsample. The economy-wide net fatherhood premium is estimated by regressing the log of 
men’s hourly wages on individual-level characteristics: 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑓𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    (1) 
Where 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗  is the natural log of hourly wage for individual i in establishment j, 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 is a 
vector of individual characteristics that affect wages detailed above, 𝑓𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝛿 is the fatherhood 
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indicator equal to one for fathers, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is a stochastic mean-zero error term. We also estimate 
two-way interaction terms between fatherhood and both education and occupation.  
The next step is to estimate the within-establishment fatherhood wage effect. An issue with 
the proportional random sampling of employees in the WES is that it results in a small average 
number of male employees per establishment in the designated age range. Canay (2011) 
developed a two-step fixed effect approach for nested data when facing a similar data structure 
problem, except in his case the issue was too few time periods in a panel. Canay (2011) showed 
that as long as fixed effects are the same across quantiles given the worker characteristics, the 
two-step approach removes fixed effects and gives consistent estimates of the slope parameters.  
Javdani (2015) adapted Canay’s approach to address the WES per-establishment sample 
size, which we follow here. The analogous assumption to Canay’s data structure issue is that the 
establishment wage effect is consistent across workers within a given establishment (and hence 
across both the full WES sample and our smaller analytical sample).This allows us to use the full 
WES sample to estimate establishment wage effects. Subsequent analyses confirm a very high 
correlation between the overall establishment effects and the sample-specific establishment 
effects (.91), consistent with Canay’s stipulation.  
The first step is therefore to use the entire WES sample to estimate the establishment 
effects, regressing log-hourly wages on the individual control variables, adding further controls 
for gender, race-ethnicity, and each establishment (Javdani, 2015: 534): 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝛿
∗ + 𝑓ijψ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   (2) 
Where 𝑓ij is a vector of indicators for each establishment and ψ is a vector of establishment 
effects measuring establishment-specific average wages conditional on worker characteristics. 
The establishment effects are saved and then subtracted from each individual’s log-hourly wage 
18 
 
to create a new, transformed dependent variable, 𝐹𝐸𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗. 𝐹𝐸𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 is individual log-
hourly wages purged of the impact of establishment-constant characteristics.  
The transformed dependent variable for the sample of white Canadian men is then used to 
estimate the within-establishment net fatherhood wage premium: 
𝐹𝐸𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝜒𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑓𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝛿
∗∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    (3) 
Group differences in within-establishment net fatherhood premiums are estimated as for the 
economy-wide differences, with a series of two-way interaction terms between fatherhood and 
educational and occupational categories. As noted above, we report the predicted fatherhood 
wage effect for each group to make comparisons more straightforward.  
The impact of establishment sorting is ascertained by comparing the economy-wide (OLS) 
estimate of the net fatherhood premium and group differences from equation (1) with the 
establishment fixed effect (EFE) estimates from equation (3). EFE estimates that are smaller than 
the economy-wide estimates indicate that some of the net premium derives from fathers sorting 
into high-wage establishments. EFE estimates that are larger than OLS estimates indicate sorting 
into low-wage establishments, as Petersen and his colleagues (2014) found for white-collar 
Norwegian men. Hausman tests confirm the significance of the establishment sorting effects 
(Pendakur & Woodcock, 2010).  
Employee sample weights are used in all analyses to adjust for the complex multi-stage 
and multi-level design of the WES when estimating standard errors. For confidentiality reasons, 
Statistics Canada does not release sampling information, but instead provides 100 sets of 
replicate weights that are adjusted copies of the sampling weights. We follow Statistics Canada’s 
recommendations and estimate standard errors using these weights.  
RESULTS 
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Weighted descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables are presented in Table 1. 
Fathers’ and childless men’s work hours and distribution across firms of varying size were 
similar. The majority of men worked between 35 and 49 hours per week regardless of parental 
status, although a slightly larger percentage of childless men worked part-time whereas a slightly 
larger percentage of fathers worked 50 or more hours per week. About two-thirds of fathers and 
childless men worked in firms of less than 100 employees. Education and occupation 
distributions were similar as well. About one-tenth of the sample had less than a high school 
degree, half possessed a high school degree, and almost 40% had post-secondary education and 
above. One-third of men were in professional occupations.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Where men differed by parental status was in average wages, partnership, experience, 
seniority, and mobility. Fathers earned $3.93 more per hour than childless men. Ninety percent 
of fathers had partners (71% married), as compared with 48% of childless men (25% married). 
Fathers were older than childless men, with about four more years of full-time experience and 
more than two years greater seniority within their establishments. Fathers’ greater seniority was 
evident as well in the slightly smaller percentage of fathers that voluntarily moved to “a better 
job” in the past five years as compared with childless men—15% versus 19%.  
Group Differences in Economy-Wide Wage Premiums  
The first three columns of Table 2 present results for assessing Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 for the full 
sample. In the discussion of all premium estimates, the predicted effects displayed in the table 
are exponentiated to present them as the predicted percentage change in fathers’ hourly wages 
associated with the characteristic (interaction plus main effects).  
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The first column displays the predicted effect of fatherhood on wages from economy-
wide OLS models for the full sample of men. The aggregate economy-wide fatherhood premium 
net of individual control variables among white Canadian men was 6.2%, (e
(0.060)
 - 1) x 100), 
identical to Hodges and Budig’s (2010, 734) estimated U.S. premium from their fixed effects 
model with full controls. Educational and occupational differences in the Canadian economy-
wide premium, however, diverged from the U.S. findings for white married fathers (Hodges & 
Budig, 2010, 735). Wage premiums for white Canadian fathers with a post-secondary certificate 
or a university degree were significantly smaller than average, at 3.9% and 3.6%, respectively. 
Predicted occupational economy-wide fatherhood wage premiums did not differ significantly 
from each other or the average. Canadian fathers in professional occupations received an 
economy-wide wage premium of 5.1%, whereas non-professional fathers received a 6.5% 
premium. It is the least-educated Canadian fathers who accrued the largest economy-wide wage 
premiums relative to their childless peers: 7.6% for high school graduates and 7.3% for high 
school dropouts. In all, OLS estimates for the full sample suggested no economy-wide premium 
advantage for highly-educated or professional white Canadian fathers. 
The second column of Table 2 presents the predicted fatherhood wage premiums net of 
establishment fixed effects (EFE) for the full sample. For ease of reference, the calculated 
percentage of the economy-wide premium accounted for by establishment sorting is in the third 
column. A positive percentage indicates sorting into higher-wage firms; a negative percentage 
indicates sorting into lower-wage firms. Sorting effects in the full sample were all statistically 
significant.  
The first hypothesis is that sorting into high-wage establishments would account for some 
of the economy-wide fatherhood wage premium among white Canadian men. The 3.9% EFE 
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estimated average premium for all fathers in the full sample was substantially smaller than the 
6.2% OLS estimate. This means that white Canadian fathers’ sorting into high-wage firms 
accounted for almost 37% of the economy-wide fatherhood hourly wage premium, strongly 
supporting Hypothesis 1.  
Results also supported the anticipated class differences in sorting and within-firm 
premiums. Sorting into high-wage establishments accounted for 60.2% of the premium for high-
school dropouts and 46.6% of the premium for dads with a high school degree. Controlling for 
establishment sorting therefore significantly reduced but did not eliminate the magnitude of these 
fathers’ premiums, to 2.8% for fathers with less than a high-school degree and 4% for fathers 
with a high school degree. Sorting into high-wage firms also accounted for about 57% of non-
professional fathers’ wage premium, reducing their estimated premium from 6.5% in the OLS to 
2.7% in the EFE model. These results strongly support the second hypothesis that sorting into 
high wage establishments would account for more of the economy-wide fatherhood premium for 
less-skilled men.  
In contrast and consistent with Petersen et al. (2014), results for the full sample indicated 
that the smaller economy-wide premium for professional and highly-educated fathers reflected 
sorting into lower-wage establishments. Once controlling for establishment sorting, fathers in 
professional occupations received a 7.0% and university-educated dads received a 5.0% wage 
premium. These were the largest within-establishment wage premiums among the full sample, 
confirming the third hypothesis that the most advantaged fathers would garner the largest 
premiums net of establishment fixed effects. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Mover Fathers 
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The predicted effects from the logit regression estimating the likelihood fathers voluntarily 
change workplaces are in Table 3. As hypothesized (H4), fathers on average were slightly (1.4%) 
but statistically significantly less likely to voluntarily change employers than childless men. 
Less-skilled fathers were slightly less likely to change employers than high-skilled fathers. As a 
whole, however, voluntary mobility is less common for fathers than childless men.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The third through sixth columns of Table 2 present OLS and EFE predicted wage 
premiums for fathers who voluntarily changed jobs in the past five years to assess Hypotheses 5, 
6a, and 6b. The first thing to note is that on average, mover fathers did worse relative to their 
childless counterparts as compared with fathers in the full sample. On average mover fathers 
incurred slight OLS and EFE wage penalties of -0.7 and -0.8%, respectively, although the 
penalties were not statistically significant. Thus the small percentage of fathers who voluntarily 
changed jobs in the past five years did not see a wage benefit from this strategy relative to 
childless men who also changed jobs. In fact, mover fathers with a high school diploma and 
those in non-professional occupations were predicted to incur significant economy-wide wage 
penalties of about 3-6% as compared with their childless mover counterparts.  
These penalties for less-skilled mover fathers contrast with the 6.3% economy-wide 
premiums for university-educated mover fathers, which is larger than the OLS estimate for 
university-educated dads in the full sample. Mover fathers with post-secondary education and 
those in professional occupations fared about the same as their counterparts in the full sample. 
The two sets of results for mover fathers indicate both a slight class gradient in the likelihood of 
voluntarily changing jobs (per Table 3), and larger class differences in the relative returns to the 
move (per Table 2).  
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The hypotheses, though, focused on the role of sorting in a mover strategy. We had 
hypothesized that fathers’ greater job search effort and/or high-wage employer discrimination 
would mean that mover fathers were more likely to sort into higher wage firms than the sample 
as a whole (H5). A comparison of the fourth (OLS) and fifth (EFE) columns in Table 2 indicates 
this, on average, was not the case. Among all mover fathers, sorting into high-wage 
establishments accounted for a statistically insignificant 14.3% of the tiny OLS estimate, far less 
than the significant 36.6% for the full sample. We therefore reject the fifth hypothesis.   
But were there class differences in sorting among mover fathers? The first class 
difference of note is that group sorting effects among mover fathers differed from those in the 
full sample. Whereas less-educated and non-professional fathers in the full sample tended to sort 
into high-wage firms, these groups of mover fathers tended to sort into low-wage firms. Net of 
sorting, the predicted wage penalties among mover fathers with a high school diploma and in 
non-professional occupations were somewhat smaller, but still statistically significant. Overall, 
less-skilled voluntary mover fathers did not end up in higher-wage firms and were relatively 
worse off as compared with their childless counterparts.   
In contrast, whereas high-skilled fathers in the full sample sorted into low-wage firms, 
high-skilled mover fathers sorted into high-wage firms. More than one-third of the premium for 
mover fathers with postsecondary credentials and more than 72% of the premium for those with 
a university degree was accounted for by sorting into high-wage firms. Sorting into high-wage 
firms also accounted for 6.3% of the premium among mover fathers in professional occupations, 
a sorting effect that is again opposite of that for professionals in the full sample. After controlling 
for establishment sorting, however, advantaged mover fathers garnered smaller premiums than 
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their counterparts in the full sample: 1.7% for university-educated mover fathers and 4.6% for 
mover fathers in professional occupations. 
Consequently, results supported Hypothesis 6b over 6a, in that high-skilled fathers who 
changed jobs around or after the birth of their first child were more likely to be sorted into 
higher-paying establishments than less-skilled mover fathers, and indeed as compared with high-
skilled fathers in the sample as a whole. Nonetheless, the wage premiums among all groups of 
fathers who voluntarily changed jobs in the past five years were smaller than for the sample as a 
whole, with moves in fact predicting significant wage penalties for less-skilled fathers.   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Micro-data used in analyses of North American fatherhood wage effects to date cannot reveal the 
role of organizations in structuring group differences. We offered a more nuanced class story of 
fathers’ establishment pathways to significant wage premiums. Given less-skilled fathers’ 
limited promotional opportunities within firms, we anticipated that sorting into high-wage firms 
would account for a larger proportion of their wage premium. In contrast, we anticipated that 
high-skilled fathers’ greater within-firm opportunity structures would lead them to receive the 
largest premiums net of establishment sorting.  
Comparisons of economy-wide estimates with those from models controlling for 
establishment fixed effects using the Canadian linked employee-employer WES data confirmed 
class differences in the establishment pathways to a premium. Highly-educated Canadian fathers 
and those in professional occupations received smaller economy-wide premiums because they 
tended to sort into lower-wage establishments. Petersen et al. (2014) found a similar sorting 
pattern for Norwegian white-collar workers. Once controlling for sorting, however, university-
educated and professional fathers received the largest within-establishment premiums as 
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hypothesized. The larger economy-wide fatherhood premium for less-skilled men, conversely, 
was accounted for by their tendency to sort into higher-wage establishments as also 
hypothesized. Net of this, they received smaller but still statistically significant wage premiums.  
Disentangling the possible contribution of selection, fathers’ motivation, or employer 
discrimination to these class differences in sorting effects is difficult given the cross-sectional 
nature of the WES data, a limitation of this study. In an attempt to gain some insight into these 
processes, we compared effects among a subsample of fathers who voluntarily changed 
workplaces in the past five years seeking better wages. As anticipated, fathers were slightly less 
likely to risk a job move than childless men. Relatedly, we anticipated the financial 
responsibilities of fatherhood would motivate those considering a move to seek out high-wage 
firms, or that high-wage employers might discriminate in favor of fathers at the point of hire. 
This was not the case. On average, sorting effects among mover fathers were not statistically 
significant. 
At the same time, there were striking class differences not only in sorting effects among 
mover fathers, but also in predicted wage effects. In contrast to the full sample, less-skilled 
fathers who changed jobs sorted into lower-wage firms and net of this incurred significant wage 
penalties rather than premiums. Patterns differed for the high-skilled fathers. Whereas high-
skilled fathers in the full sample tended to sort into low-wage firms, those moving employers 
sorted into high-wage firms. Hence the economy-wide premiums of fathers in professional 
occupations and with postsecondary education and above were about the same as or larger than 
in the full sample, but high-skilled movers achieved this by sorting into high-wage firms.  
Assuming fathers of all skill levels considering a move are similarly motivated to find 
high-wage firms, one reason for these class differences could be that high-skilled fathers are 
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better at identifying high-wage firms. Another possibility is that high-wage employers favor 
fatherhood as indicative of greater productivity at the point of hire only when coupled with the 
technical skills and rational authority valued by bureaucratic organizations (Acker, 1990; Hodges 
& Budig, 2010). Although correspondence studies to date find no statistically significant 
employer hiring preference for fathers (Bygren et al., 2017; Correll et al., 2007), future field 
experiments should gather information on establishments’ average wage levels to ascertain 
whether high-wage firms favor fathers and high-skilled fathers in particular during hiring even if 
average- or low-wage firms do not. 
Once accounting for establishment sorting, though, high-skilled mover fathers’ premiums 
relative to childless men were smaller than in the sample as a whole. This could suggest that 
within higher-wage firms, high-skilled fathers’ relative productivity vis-à-vis similar childless 
men is not as pronounced. At the same time, results for the sample as a whole indicate that 
fathers accrue their premiums with tenure within a firm. Fathers who moved jobs in the past five 
years have not yet accumulated as much tenure as the full sample, which could account for lower 
within-firm premiums among skilled mover-fathers.   
In all, results indicated that less-skilled fathers’ establishment pathway to a fatherhood 
wage premium is likely via pre-birth selection into high-wage firms and remaining with such 
firms to accrue their greater returns to tenure. Future research with suitable matched employee-
employer panel data at the individual level will need to confirm this. Such data allow for 
individual fixed effects models to control for unmeasured heterogeneity among men, as well as 
between-establishment comparisons of men’s average wage growth rates before and after the 
transition to fatherhood (see Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009). Although such data are still 
somewhat rare, their availability is steadily increasing (Lazear & Shaw, 2008; Tomaskovic-
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Devey & Avent-Holt, 2016). We also did not model dynamics associated with non-voluntary 
mobility, which could contribute to the more positive employer sorting for low-skilled fathers in 
the full sample. Although Fuller (2008) found that U.S. men experiencing negative moves such 
as layoffs or termination generally incurred wage penalties, it is possible that employers may be 
more hesitant to fire or lay off less-skilled fathers. Another possibility is that potential new 
employers may be more generous in their interpretation of such events for low-skilled, job-
seeking fathers. Assessing parental wage effects and sorting around involuntary moves must be 
left to future research. 
High-skilled fathers have two establishment pathways to their wage premium. Although 
high-skilled fathers in the full sample were sorted into lower-paying establishments, they 
received the largest wage premiums within establishments.  In contrast, high-skilled fathers who 
moved jobs tended to sort into high-wage firms, but received somewhat smaller within-
establishment premiums than the full sample. These smaller premiums could, however, reflect 
their shorter post-move tenure. In all we interpret results as indicating the larger premiums 
accruing to high-skilled fathers within firms also accumulate with tenure, but regardless of a 
firm’s average wage levels. Whether their larger within-firm premiums reflect favoritism in 
bureaucratic organizations as argued by Hodges and Budig (2010) cannot be tested directly with 
these data.  
The class differences in the contribution of establishment sorting to fatherhood wage 
premiums in the full sample raise a compelling question. Why have the majority of high-skilled 
Canadian fathers, like their Norwegian counterparts (Petersen, et al., 2014), sorted into low-wage 
establishments? One possibility is that high-skilled men select lower-wage establishments to find 
better work-life balance, the compensating differential argued to account for motherhood wage 
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penalties (Javdani, 2015). We pose this possibility given the evidence that fathers’ childcare time 
increases with greater education (Raley, Bianchi, & Wang, 2012) and higher wages (Cooke & 
Hook, forthcoming). Yet employer expectations of work devotion from this group of employees 
create greater potential for conflict between work and family. High-skilled fathers may 
consequently choose low-wage establishments if such employers accommodate family demands 
in exchange for lower average wages. This is an intriguing possibility to be explored in future 
research. 
 A final thing to note is that the national context matters. Although the Canadian average 
economy-wide fatherhood premium was similar to that reported for U.S. dads (Hodges & Budig, 
2010; Killewald, 2013), privileged Canadian fathers garnered no economy-wide class advantage. 
Instead, the least-educated Canadian fathers received the largest premium net of their individual 
characteristics relative to their childless peers. These country differences in group effects support 
Acker’s (2006) observation that organizational equality regimes reflect the broader socio-
economic contexts in which they are situated. One way Canada differs from the United States is 
that twice as many workers are unionized (Card, et al., 2003). Freeman (1980) highlighted that 
unionization simultaneously raised the wage floor and blunted the returns paid to high-skilled 
workers. The greater prevalence of collective bargaining agreements in Canada may account for 
the smaller economy-wide educational and occupational differences in net fatherhood premiums 
reported here. More research is needed on how establishment-level collective bargaining, along 
with policies relating to performance reviews, promotions, and compensation packages further 
shape group differences in parental wage effects. 
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Table 1. Weighted Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables, White Canadian 
Men Age 24 to 44  
 
Childless men Fathers 
N of men  8,878 12,347 
Wages  20.32  24.25 
 (10.88) (13.74) 
< High school  10 %  12 % 
High school  51 %  52 % 
Postsecondary  18 %  19 % 
University  21 %  17 % 
Manager or Professional  31 %  33 % 
Other occupation  69 %  67 % 
Changed to “a better job” past five years  19 %  15 % 
No spouse  52 %  10 % 
Married   25 %  71 % 
Cohabiting  23 %  19 % 
1-19 Employees  30 %  31 % 
20-99 Employees  35 %  32 % 
100-499 Employees  21 %  22 % 
500+ Employees  14 %  15 % 
Age  33.3  36.9 
  (5.8)  (4.9) 
Experience (years)  11.8  16.2 
  (6.6)  (6.1) 
Seniority (years)  5.9  8.0 
  (5.6)  (6.4) 
<35 hours week  9 %  3 % 
35-49 hours week  77 %  78 % 
50+ hours week  14 %  19 % 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of interval measures.   
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Table 2. Predicted Net Fatherhood Wage Premiums with Bootstrap Standard Errors, Economy-Wide (OLS) versus Net of 
Establishment Fixed Effects (EFE), All White Canadian Men age 24 to 44 and Those Who Voluntarily Moved Jobs in the Past Five 
Years  
 ALL MEN MEN MOVING JOBS PAST 5 YEARS 
 Economy- 
Wide (OLS) 
 EFE % OLS 
due to 
sorting 
Economy- 
Wide (OLS) 
 EFE % OLS 
due to 
sorting 
N of men 21,225 21,225    3,165   3,165  
All fathers    0.060***  0.038*** 36.6% - 0.007 - 0.008 14.3% 
 (0.002) (0.002)   (0.004)  (0.004)  
Fathers with less than high school  0.070***  0.028*** 
a
 60.2%  0.022   0.032*** -45.5% 
 (0.005) (0.003)   (0.013)  (0.005)  
Fathers with a high school diploma  0.073***
 a, b
  0.039*** 47.0% - 0.060***
 a
 - 0.038***
 a
 -36.6% 
 (0.003) (0.002)   (0.008)  (0.006)  
Fathers with post-secondary certificate  0.038***
 a
  0.031*** 19.2%  0.040***
 a
  0.026***  35.0% 
 (0.004) (0.003)   (0.009)  (0.007)  
Fathers with a university degree   0.035 
a
  0.049*** -38.8%  0.061***
 a
  0.017**
 a,b
  72.1% 
 (0.007) (0.005)   (0.009)  (0.006)  
Fathers in other occupations  0.063***  0.027*** 
a,b
 56.9% - 0.031*** - 0.030*** 
a,b
 -3.2% 
 (0.002) (0.002)   (0.007)  (0.005)  
Fathers in professional/ 0.053*** 0.063*** 
a,b
 -24.4%  0.048***
 a,b
  0.045*** 
a, b 
  6.3% 
 managerial occupations (0.005) (0.003)   (0.007)  (0.005)  
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* p<.05,** p<.01,*** p<.001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Controlling for marital status (three categories, married referent), years of full-time experience, years of full-time experience 
squared, education (four categories, high school degree referent), interactions between the experience and education measures, tenure 
with employer, tenure squared, interactions between education and tenure, part-time and long work hours, occupation (non-
professional occupations referent), and survey year. Superscript (a) indicates the estimate is significantly different from the average 
premium; superscript (b) indicates the estimate is significantly different from all others within the group. A positive percentage of 
sorting indicates sorting into higher-wage firms, whereas a negative percentage indicates sorting into lower-wage firms. All sorting 
effects are statistically significant at p < .05 except where the percentage is in italics. 
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Table 3. Predicted likelihood of Voluntarily Changing Jobs in the Past Five Years, White 
Canadian Men age 24 to 44 
Notes: Controlling for survey year, experience, experience squared, education and its interaction 
with experience and experience squared, short or long work hours, and survey year.  
  Predicted 
Premiums 
All fathers - 0.014*** 
  (0.002) 
Fathers with less than high school - 0.029*** 
  (.004) 
Fathers with a high school diploma - 0.020*** 
  (.003) 
Fathers with post-secondary certificate - 0.020*** 
  (.003) 
Fathers with a university degree   0.019*** 
  (.005) 
Fathers in other occupation - 0.027*** 
  (.003) 
Fathers in professional/  0.014*** 
  managerial occupation  (.003) 
N of men  21,225 
* p<.05,** p<.01,*** p<.001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
  
